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Abstract
Impacts from climate change vary significantly across world regions. Whereas
regions in tropical and subtropical areas will sufer severely from the effects of cli-
mate change, are the impact estimates for regions in more northern latitudes relative
moderate. But regions can not be considered as independent from each others ex-
posure. In this paper we examine the spillover of climate change impacts between
regions through international trade within a climate sensitive, dynamic CGE model
with international trade. Under the emission scenario SRES A1B we observe at the
end of the twenty-first century regional losses between 2 and 13 % GDP relative
to a scenario without climate change. By means of a decomposition method we
show that such a spillover of damages through international trade has a significant
influence, positive or negative, on the total costs of climate change for a region. For
regions with low exposure to climate change and high adaptive capacities, spillover
effects are responsible for a third of total costs from climate change.
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1 Introduction
There is no doubt that global climate is changing. The fourth assessment report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides striking evidence that
during the last century the world’s surface temperature has increased by 0.6 in average,
and concludes that a further increase by additional 1.4 to 5.8  must be expected by
2100 (IPCC 2007b).
Today, the impact which global climate change might have on life on earth, is still
less well known than the basic science of climate change. Nevertheless, present knowl-
edge suggests that global warming will have multiple socio-economic effects, which might
range from merely inconvenient to disastrous. For example, Stern (2006) has estimated
that the world economy might suffer losses in the order of 5-7% GDP annually, if global
average temperature rises by 5-6  until the end of 2100. Mendelsohn, Morrison,
Schlesinger, and Andronova (2000) have reported lower damages, which nonetheless
range from 1 % to 5 % of the world’s GDP in case that the average world temperature
rises by 2  by the middle of the present century.
However, regions are not equally exposed to environmental and societal impacts
from global warming. As shown by Ba¨ttig, Wild, and Imboden (2007), the magnitude
and direction of precipitation and temperature changes and the probability of extreme
weather differ significantly across countries. Whereas countries near the equator are
heavily exposed to changes in climatic conditions and variability, the exposure of coun-
tries in higher latitudes is much smaller. This is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows
the Climate Change Index by Ba¨ttig, Wild, and Imboden (2007) per country. This in-
dex summarizes annual temperature and precipitation change, as well as the incidence
of extreme events as expected from data of global circulation models for the period
2071-2100.
Beside the geographic location, a region’s exposure to climate change depends on its
abilities to adapt, which in turn depends on the societies’ institutions, the level of edu-
cation and economic wealth (see Brooks, Adger, and Kelly (2005)). Most studies argue
that less developed countries in low latidues are more sensitive with respect to climate
change and variability (IPCC 2007a) than developed regions, which mostly have the
capacity to adapt their economic and social structures at least in parts to the expected
climate change disruptions.
Tol, Downing, Kuik, and Smith (2004) discern between four categories of countries
depending on their exposure to climate change and variability as well as on the adaptive
capacities. The first one covers highly vulnerable countries like Bangladesh, one of the
poorest countries in the world and heavily exposed to sea level rise and cyclones. The
second category includes countries such as Namibia with low adaptive capacities as well,
but which are not exposed to the risks of climate change to the same extent. Countries
like Australia and the United States belong to a third category and are characterized
by a high ability to adapt to climate impacts. Finally, the last category comprehends
countries with high adaptive capacities and low impacts. Examples are countries from
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Figure 1: Climate Change Index on country-level for the period of 2071 - 2100. The
Climate Change Index is the weighted mean of four indicators: (i) changes in annual
temperature, (ii) changes in annual precipitation, (iii) changes in extreme temperature
events, and (iv) changes in extreme precipitation events. Source: Ba¨ttig et al. (2007)
the northern hemisphere such as Norway and Canada.
As this classification indicates, both the exposure to climate change as well as the
ability to adapt, are unevenly distributed across countries. And in most cases, regions
which are expected to suffer from severe impacts of climate change, are the ones with
low adaptive capacities.
Now, since regions differ in both how they are affected by climate change and how
they are able to cope with the resulting economic effects, the societies’ welfare, the costs
of production as well as relative prices of factors will differ from region to region. This
must have an impact on prices in international markets and hence on Terms of Trade.
Consequently, global climate change imposes not only damages, which are directly at-
tributed to a single region. In a world with highly integrated markets costs of global
climate change, which originate in some region, might spill over to other regions via
these channels.
Hurricane Katrina provides one of the most striking examples of how damages, which
occur in one region, spillover into others. Katrina directly caused total damages of 81
billion U.S. Dollars (in prices of 2005) on property in the regions Mississippi, Louisiana
and Alabama (Blake, Rappaport, and Landsea 2007). The massive disruption of oil
production and processing in the Gulf of Mexico has led to a shortage in gasoline supply.
During the week after the storm, U.S. gasoline prices jumped up by as much as 60 cents
per gallon (New York Times, 04.09.2005), and in the United Kingdom gasoline prices
rose by 3-4 pence per liter in the aftermath of the hurricane (BBC News, 02.09.2005).
British consumers and firms, far away from the Gulf of Mexico, were confronted with
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higher energy costs, at least in the short run.
There is also empirical evidence that climate shocks affect the exports of a country.
A recent paper by Jones and Olken (2010) has estimated the effects of climate shocks on
the annual growth rate of exports. Their results show that in poorer, more vulnerable
countries the annual growth rate of exports is reduced by 2 to 5.7 percentage points if
the annual average temperature is increased by 1 . Obviously this must have an effect
also on the importing country.
It is the purpose of this paper (i) to explore both, qualitatively and quantitatively,
direct and spillover effects of climate change for regional economies and (ii) to examine
how the comprehension of trade changes the distribution of climate related costs and
benefits.
To capture the distinction between conventional climate impacts, as used in most
existing impact studies (e.g. Mendelsohn, Morrison, Schlesinger, and Andronova (2000)),
and effects which are caused by international trade, we use the following definitions:
Direct effects are impacts of climate change on the regional economy. The resulting
costs and benefits are bore in the region which was hit by the climate impact. Spillover
effects are effects of climate change, which affect welfare in regions different from the one,
where the impact has occurred. They materialize in terms of trade effects, i.e. changing
relative prices of commodities or factors in international trade.1
Discerning between direct and spillover effects is of particular importance for the
assessment of climate related costs and benefits for small open economies. For countries
which are classified by Tol, Downing, Kuik, and Smith (2004) as countries with low
impacts and high adaptive capacities it might happen that spillover effects will dominate
the market costs of climate change in the country itself.
For assessing these effects, both quantitatively and qualitatively, we develop a multi-
sector, multi-regional, dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, where the
future climate is exogenously given by data from global circulation models.2 To estimate
regional impacts we slightly modified the damage function of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
Although the formulation has some serious shortcomings, due to it’s simplicity it is still
used often. This allows to compare our results with other studies.
To assess how the different regional impacts of climate change affect international
trade and to which extend impacts spillover into other regions, we apply a decomposition
method for general equilibrium effects. This allows to calculate the individual contribu-
tion of a region’s climate impact on the total costs of climate change for other regions.
The decomposition of impacts shows that spillover effects are responsible for about 20-
30% of the total climate costs for regions which are provided with high capacities to
1Note that our analysis neglects non-market damages such as amenity value losses from biodiversity,
etc. because non-market damages are by definition damages which are not treated by the economic sys-
tem itself. Such non-market damages will therefore not transmitted by changes in economic institutions
as prices, but uses rather different channels as the media, etc.
2Since we are not interested in optimal policies with respect to GHG emissions we abstain from closing
the carbon cycle and a subsequent cost-benefit analysis of this issue.
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adapt and are less exposed to climate change.
Several studies in the field of business cycle analysis examine the transmission of
economic shocks from one country to another. Examples are Frankel and Rose (1998)
and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), who examine the comovement of business cycles of
different regions due to a contagion by international trade and factor movement. They
find evidence that increased trade between a pair of countries increases the magnitude
of transmission of productivity shocks between this two countries. Kose and Yi (2006)
then reproduce these effects in a real business cycle model. This spillover of shocks has
the same cause and the transmission flows in the same channel as in our model, although
our model differs from their model with respect to time horizons and the inclusion of
monetary markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the mechanism of
this spillover effects with an Edgeworth-Box representation at hand. Section 3 discusses
(i) the expected impacts of climate change on different world regions, and (ii) explains,
how climate change impacts are integrated in the economic model. Section 4 describes
the model which is based on a dynamic general equilibrium representation of the world
economy. Section 5 presents the results of our numerical simulations. The decomposition
of the costs into direct and spillover effects is explained in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 Spillover Effects: An Illustration
To get some intuition let us briefly discuss the role of spillover effects in the framework
of a pure exchange economy as shown in Figure 2. There are two countries, N and
S, and the two commodities, x and y, denote the total endowment of good 1 and 2,
respectively. S owns the fraction γ (λ) of the total amount of y (x). The remaining
endowment (1 − γ) and (1 − λ), respectively, are in the property of N . Without trade
allocation a will be realized. If there is trade between the both regions, allocation b is
attainable, which is Paretosuperior.
Now let us assume that there is a negative asymmetric shock such that S looses half
its initial endowments. If, as in Figure 2, S has a high share of the initial endowment
in y, y becomes scarce, and hence, more expensive. The terms of trade are worsen from
N ’s perspective, i.e, N now gets less in exchange for a unity of commodity 1 and benefits
from trade are lower. Compared to the situation ex ante, although not directly affected,
N suffers welfare losses because of terms of trade effects resulting from the impact in
S.3
Figure 2 also shows N ’s maximum costs resulting from those spillover effects. In case
of a total extinction of country S, country N would fall back to the welfare level as in
3Note that also positive spillovers from a negative shock in the economy of the trading partner
are possible. If we assume the shock would affect only the sector, in which the affected region has
a comparative disadvantage, this would enforce the existing terms of trade into the direction of the
unaffected country. The additional purchasing power would make the not affected country better off.
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Figure 2: The Edgeworth box above shows the situation before the shock. In the figure
below S has lost half of his output after the shock.
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autarky. In this case, maximum spillover costs are equal to total benefits from trade.
But this is only one side of the coin. While N has to bear a part of the costs of
the shock on S, S profits from bilateral trade. Since the terms of trade effect favors the
affected country S, its welfare losses from the negative shock are dampened. From the
perspective of S, international trade reduces effective costs from climate change and can
therefore be considered as an implicit adaptation measure.
3 Estimating Impacts from Climate Change
Whereas the natural sciences behind climate change are relatively clear and robust,
estimates of the socio-economic impacts of climate change are still characterized by a
significant degree of uncertainty. Jamet and Corfee-Morlot (2009) identify four reasons,
why this is the case: First, projections about the development of greenhouse gas emis-
sions depend among others on population as well as on economic growth, technological
progress and policy interventions, which are all difficult to estimate. Second, we do not
fully understand all geophysical and ecological feedbacks, e.g. how sensitive the sea level
responds to global temperature changes is highly debated. Third, the risk of abrupt and
irreversible impacts, as for example a breakdown of ocean currents or an abrupt melting
of large ice shields in polar regions, cannot be quantified. Finally, the aggregation of
global impacts with an uniform metric is still an open issue, in particular since impacts
have to be aggregated along three dimensions: across different sectors, which requires
a common measure such US $, across regions, which raises the question of equity, and
over time, where the role of discounting is in debate.
Today, sophisticated climate models are available, but the complexities and com-
putational demands prevent their direct application in integrated assessments analysis.
Therefore there is a need to develop proxies to transfer the climate scientists’ knowl-
edge into the economic analysis of the greenhouse effect. A proxy for capturing the
socio-economic impacts of climate change, typically used in most integrated assessment
models and global impacts studies, is the so-called damage function. Generally, these
functions are simplified and are calibrated only at two points: (1) the status quo, and
(2) the impact of a doubling of the pre-industrial CO2 concentration in the atmosphere.
Moreover, these estimates are mostly based on U.S. data. To estimate climate change
impacts in other world regions, these estimates will be simply extraoplated.4
Although we are fully aware that the choice of the impact function is crucial for the
outcome of a cost assessment of climate change, we resort to the impact and damage
4Not surprisingly, impacts differ largely in existing studies. Mendelsohn, Morrison, Schlesinger, and
Andronova (2000) estimate that for a 3  increase of global mean temperature global costs and benefits
almost offset each other, Tol (2002) predicts losses of about 1 per cent of annual Gross World Product
(GWP). Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), which include the willingness to pay to avoid catastrophic impacts,
forecast costs of about 3 per cent of GWP. The Stern Review (2007) reports a loss of about one per cent
of GDP per capita. For a broader discussion of impact estimates in the integrated assessment literature
see Stern (2007), Smith, Schellhuber, and Mirza (2001), and Jamet and Corfee-Morlot (2009).
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sub-model of the Regional Dynamic Integrated Climtate Economy (RICE) framework
(Nordhaus and Boyer (2000)) for four reasons: (1) it includes a wide range of affected
sectors, (2) it captures regional differences in adaptive capacity, (3) it is transparent in
the aggregation of damages, and (4) it is relatively easy to adapt to our needs. Never-
theless, the comparison with simulation results of different impact modules would give
additional insights about the sensitivity of our results. We leave that open for future
work.
The RICE damage assessment captures both market and non-market damages (which
we neglect as described for the subsequent analysis). Market damages can be expressed
in terms of a national accounting system. They include impacts of climate change on
the agricultural sector, on coastal resources, on forestry, energy- and water systems, on
construction, on fisheries, and on certain settlements, which can not be protected from
climate change.
Additionally, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) use information from expert interviews
about the likelihood of occurrence of catastrophic events at a certain temperature in-
creases to calculate the willingness to pay to avoid such catastrophic damages. The
resulting insurance premia are significant for some regions. For example, India, that
will suffer from a potential shift in monsoon pattern, or the European countries, which
face a potential change in the thermohaline circulation, are willing to pay about 2% of
GDP to avoid this risks. This inclusion of catastrophic events is the main reason for
the significant larger impacts for temperatures above 2  compared to other impact
assessment studies.
3.1 Climate Data
To estimate the future climate impacts, we require information about future temperature
changes. For that we use temperature data generated by the general circulation model
(GCM) ECHAM5 (Roeckner, Bauml, Bonaventura, et al. 2005), which has contributed-
imporant findings for the recent fourth assessment report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC 2007b, ch.10). The resolution of ECHAM5 is
about 200 km, which is detailled enough to calculate average temperature changes for
the world regions in our model.
The ECHAM5 model provides average monthly surface temperature data for ev-
ery grid point at the time periods 2011-2030, 2046-2065, and 2080-2099. Temperature
anomalies are calculated relative to the mean of the period 1961-1990.5 We aggregate
annual mean temperature anomalies for every region and assume a lineary temperature
increase linearly between the declared periods.6
The main driver of the atmospheric warming are antropoghenic greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Although strongly depending on economic developments, emission scenarios are
exogenously given in our model. However, since we are not interested in optimal mit-
5Output from ECHAM5 experiments can be downloaded from http://www.ipcc-data.org
6See Table 3 in the Appendix for regional mean temperatures in 2100.
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igation policies, such a cost-effectiveness approach is justifiable. The future emission
projections, which serve as input for the GCM-data used in our model, are given by
IPCC SRES scenario A1B (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000), the most prominent scenario
in IPCC AR4. But note thate these scenarios do not consider explicit policy actions to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
The highest temperature increase is observed in polar regions. The large mean
temperature increase in Russia and in North America can be explained mainly through
the accelerated warming in northern parts of the respective countries. 7
Apart from polar regions are he highest increase in regional temperature (about 5.5
 in 2100) expected in South Asia. For Europe the expected temperature rise will
be approximately 4.5 . In areas, which already today face high average temperatures
such as Sub-Sahara Africa, temperatures will disproportionately increase by 5.2 . On
average the world temperature will rise 4.22  relative to the control period. The
relative low increase is caused by the slower warming of the inertial ocean surface.
3.2 Calibrating the Damage Function
We divide the world into regions which differ with respect to the exposure to in inter-
national trade and the exposure to the risks of climate change. Therefore our model
slightly differs from RICE. First, in contrast to RICE, which discerns between eight
regions, our model distinguishes between fifteen regions. Table 3.2 shows the regional
aggregation. Second, whereas in RICE regional impacts are related to global mean
temperature change, we use differentiated temperature estimates for every region.
To calculate climate impacts we distinguish between impacts depending on regional
temperature changes and impacts, which are caused by global scale changes. For each
region r the aggregated impact at date t is represented by the sum of two quadratic
functions. For an explanation remember that climate impacts on agriculture, forestry
and fisheries, on energy- and water supply, in outdoor recreation, in settlements, and in
human health are primarily driven by changes in regional temperature. But sea level
rise is caused by temperature changes in polar regions as well as by the expansion of
warmer water, which depends on air temperature over the ocean. Therefore global mean
temperature change is viewed as main causer for this global scale processes.
For calibrating the regional damage functions we neglect non-market damages. In-
stead we concentrate the analysis only on impacts from market based sectors, which are
calibrated by data from the RICE model. That means in particular that a 2.5  aver-
age warming would imply in the agricultural sector impacts, which range from benefits
of 0.87 % GDP in GUS to annual costs of 0.5 % in Southern Europe. If global mean
temperature raises by 6  this could cause severe impacts on coastal infrastructure.
The studies considered in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) estimate costs of 3.3 % GDP for
7The Arctic regions in those countries are sparsely populated and of less economic importance, but
our economic data, which is aggregated on a county-level, does not allow to control for with-in country
heterogenity. We thus potentially overestimate economic damages in this two large countries.
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Region Associated Countries
Western European Union (WEU) Fra, Esp, Prt
Eastern European Union (EEU) Aut, Cze, Pol, ...
South-Eastern Europe (SEE) Ita, Grc, Tur, ...
Northern Europe (NEU) Deu, UK, Swe, ...
NAFTA (NAF) USA, Can, Mex
South America (SAM) Arg, Ven, Bra, ...
Middle East and North Africa (MEN) Sau, Mar, Tun, ...
Sub-Sahara Africa (SAF) Zaf, Uga, Tza, ...
Oceania (OCE) Aus, Nzl, ...
China (CHN) Chn
East Asia (EAS) Jpn, Kor, Twn, ...
Southeast Asia (SEA) Ino, Mys, Tha, ...
South Asia (SOA) Ind, Bgd, Lka, ...
GUS (GUS) Rus, Kaz, Ukr, ...
Switzerland (CHE) Swi
Table 1: The regional aggregation of the model.
India to safe their coastline, whereas Europe has to invest nearly 2.2 % in unproductive
adaptation measures.
The willingness to pay to avoid catastrophic impacts, which is included in the impact
assessment of the RICE model, is not a clear-cut market damage, since the costs caused
by such events are not totally captured by national accounting systems and have also
a non market component. But we argue that the predominant part of the costs from
catastrophic events is reflected in economic terms and should be included in such an
analysis. Compared to other global impact studies the comprehension of catastrophic
impacts causes significant higher damages in European regions and in South Asia. The
catastrophic events which cause this high costs, are in the case of Europe the potential
shutdown of the thermohaline circulation and the increased probability of a significant
shift in the monsoon patterns in South Asia. To avoid this risk in case of a 6  warming,
the two regions would be willing to pay an insurance premium of 13 and 15 % GDP,
according to Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
Summarizing the results from above, the climate-damage relationship used in the
economic analysis can be described as follows:
Dr,t = θ1r∆RTr,t + θ
2
r(∆RTr,t)
2 + θ3r∆GTt + θ
4
r(∆GTt)
2. (1)
At date t region r has to cope with economic costs from climate change Dr,t. These
damages are a quadratic function of the regional temperature change relative to pre-
industrial times, ∆RTr,t, plus the change in the global mean temperature, ∆GTt. The
coefficients θjr, j ∈ {1, 2} (j ∈ {3, 4}) capture the economic sensitivity to regional (global)
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mean temperature changes.
Note that the different European regions have identical damage coefficients, since
the impact data from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) does not allow to distinguish between
different European regions. This does not imply, however, that damages in a particular
point in time are equal since temperature changes may differ.
4 The Economic Model
To analyze how climate change affects international trade and to isolate direct from
spillover effects we develop a multi-commodity, multi-region dynamic general equilibrium
model of the world economy. The time horizon covers a period of 100 years. The model
starts in the year 2010 and the results are reported every 10 years. Each region is
viewed as being homogeneous and acts as if it is represented by a representative agent,
who maximizes intertemporal welfare. Changes of the global climate is given for the
regional decision makers, and hence, the adaption of trade patterns, investments and
production decisions are the only options to minimize costs from those impacts.
At each point in time there are five commodities, which are traded on open interna-
tional markets. These are (1) agricultural products (Ar,t) such as crops, wheat, but also
outputs from forestry and fishery, (2) basic material (Br,t), which covers labor intensive
produced goods like clothes, (3) high value goods (Hr,t), which are capital intensive man-
ufacturing goods such as machinery and motor vehicles, (4) services (Sr,t) like health,
transport and financial services, and (5) fossil fuels(Fr,t). For the composition of the
commodity classes see Table 4 in the Appendix.
Further inputs into regional production are capital, labor and renewable energy,
which are, however, not traded internationally. The model is formulated as a mixed
complementarity problem (MCP) with the GAMS software package (Rutherford 1995).
Many other prominent models in this field are formulated as non-linear programs and use
through an iterative method defined weights in the objective function. The formulation
as a MCP allows to abstain from those error-prone iterative algorithms.
4.1 Production and International Trade
Production is highly aggregated. For the sake of simplicity we assume that (1) all regions
have access to the same production technologies, and (2) there is no technological change.
The production of all goods are characterized by constant elasticities of substitution
(CES). All production functions are homogeneous of degree one.
In each region a specific macro-good Yr,t is produced with two aggregates of inputs:
a composite good Gr,t, which aggregates total regional demand of A,B,H, S and energy
Er,t with
Yr,t = Ωr,t(θYr E
ρY
r,t + (1− θYr )GρYrt )1/ρY , (2)
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Figure 3: Regional gross production Yr,t is an aggregate of a composite good and energy.
Goods are traded internationally and energy is based on international traded fossil energy
and non-traded non-fossil energy.
where Ωr,t = 1/(1 + Dr,t) is the regional climate damage factor. Ωr,t captures the
economic costs of climate change as described in the chapter before. The higher damages
Dr,t are, the smaller is the net output of a region. Figure 3 shows the top-level of the
production structure.
The net macro output Yr,t can be consumed Cr,t, invested in regional capital stock
Ir,t or used as an input in the production of traded commodities IMr,t,i. Hence, the
following market clearance condition has to hold for the macro good:
Yr,t = Cr,t + Ir,t +
∑
i
IMr,t,i, ∀i ∈ {A,B,H, S}. (3)
Further inputs into the production of commodity i are capital and labor. Figure
4 explains the basic production structure of the model. The produced output of good
i then can be exported and/or used domestically. Imports and the domestically used
outputs serve then as inputs in the regional macro production.
Since all regions use the same production technology, the rationale for trade are (1)
differences in factor endowments and (2) different exposure to climate impacts. The
first rationale refers to a Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade whereas the second is based on
classical Ricardian considerations of comparative advantages.
We assume non-perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign goods of the
same variety (Armington 1968). This assumption is assumed for all traded commodities
except for the fossil energy market. For this highly standardized good we suppose perfect
homogeneity and hence a common world market price.
The model abstracts from explicit trade distortions. Neither transportation costs
nor an explicit modeling of tariffs or export subsidies are considered in the model. We
further do not allow for imbalances in trade balances.
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Figure 4: Capital, labor and the macro good Yr,t serve as inputs for the production of
good i. A fraction of the production of commodity i is then exported to foreign. The
remaining share together with imports enter in turn in the macro good production.
4.2 Intertemporal Utility Optimization
To determine optimal consumption and investment trajectories we use a Ramsey ap-
proach. More precisely, in each region r a representative agent maximizes a constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution utility function (CIES).
Ur =
2100∑
t=2010
(
1
1 + δ
)−t+1
C1−σr,t − 1
1− σ , (4)
where δ describes the discount rate and σ refers to the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. From period t to period t + 1 households face the following
budget constraint:
pYr,t(Cr,t + Ir,t) = wr,tLr,t + rkr,tKr,t + p
F
t F r,t , (5)
thus expenditures for consumption and investment expressed in prices of the macro
good, pYr,t, have to be equal to capital and labor income, where wr,t and rkr,t denote the
wage and rental rate of capital, respectivly, plus the rent from selling the endowment of
fossil energy on the international market pFt F r,t.
Note that production factors are only mobile within but not across regions8 and the
capital stocks depreciate at a constant rate, which is identical for all regions.
4.3 Calibration of the Economic Model
The economic growth rate is one of the main drivers of the future emissions of greenhouse
gases and strongly influence expected climate change. To assure that the temperature
change, which is the trigger for impacts, is consistent with the greenhouse gas emission
8Although the consideration of factor mobility might be important to map the whole magnitude
of spillover effects, we neglect the possibility of foreign direct investments in this paper. Allowing
production factors to move in regions which are less exposed to climate change might be an efficient type
of adaptation. Since we focus on the examination of the principal mode of action of spillover effects, we
let the question about the consequence of factor mobility open for further research.
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trajectory and the respective extensiveness of the economy, exogenous growth rates are
taken from the IPCC SRES emission scenario A1B.
Since the time horizon of the model is finite, whereas the maximizing household
mimic as if his horizon would be infinite, problems related to end of time effects may
appear. To avoid this problems we apply the methods suggested by Lau, Pahlke, and
Rutherford (2002).
Finding realistic elasticities of substitution is a difficult and often unsatisfied chal-
lenge. Difficult because the choice can strongly influence the results. Unsatisfying be-
cause not enough empirical evidence exits, which would help to choose the ’right’ elas-
ticity, especially over such a long time horizon. Nevertheless, Armington elasticities are
taken from Gallaway, McDaniel, and Rivera (2003). Other elasticities such as the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labor in the different sectors are taken from
Okagawa and Ban (2008) and Kemfert and Welsch (2000). In section 5.3 will we conduct
a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the chosen parameter values.
The regional economies and their trade patterns are calibrated with data from the
GTAP6 project (Dimaranan 2006).
5 Counterfactual Analysis
The climage change costs of a region are defined as the difference between the outcome
of the baseline scenario with no climate induced impacts and the outcome of a scenario
with climate induced impacts as described above. We call the climate change scenario
A1B with respect to the corresponding emission scenario.
5.1 The Costs of Climate Change
The comparision of the two simulations shows that climate change causes significant
costs for the world economy in the long run. Figure 5 illustrates the differences in
main indicators between the two scenarios. We observe a slightly higher Gross World
Product (GWP) in A1B compared to baseline, but from 2035 onwards adverse impacts
from climate change increase. In 2100, annual losses from climate change account for 4
per cent of the baseline GWP. The positive effect on GWP during the first third of the
twenty first century can be explained by two reasons: on the one hand, a small warming
causes benefits in some regions due to increases in agricultural productivity. On the
other hand, regions accumulate more capital in the beginning to smooth consumption
over time and damp larger impacts in later periods.9
The negative impacts of climate change in later periods depend on several factors.
First, the average temperature at the end of the century in the different regions is by
4  up to almost 7  higher than today. According to our calibrated climate damage
9Note that this additional capital accumulation is an implicit kind of adaptation against damages in
later periods from climate change. Obviously, the size of this effect depends on the supposed discount
rate.
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Figure 5: Changes in GWP, aggregated investments, trade volume, and consumption
relative to the baseline scenario.
function such a warming would cause an annual loss of GDP between 1 and 9.2 %.
But this neglects the inherent economic dynamics of the process. As pointed out by
Fankhauser and Tol (2005) two types of “horizontal linkages” are relevant for the assess-
ment of climate induced economic costs. If a constant saving rate is assumed, a climate
induced output loss leads to a reduction of savings and investments since less capital is
accumulated, and hence, output is lower. In a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, such as
the one used here, a second effect matters since forward-looking agents anticipate future
climate costs and adapt saving decisions. Thus, savings may increase to compensate
losses in future income or may decrease as damages reduce capital productivity.
A comparison of both investment trajectories shows evidence for both cases. In the
first thirty years of the simulation period, the sum of regional investments is slightly
higher in A1B compared to baseline to compensate future shortfalls and to profit from
productivity gains, which come along with a moderate warming.
A further factor which affects climate change induced costs are the so called inter-
mediate effects (Stern 2007, p.152). The production of most goods uses intermediate
goods as inputs and when these inputs already are affected by climate change, damages
in one sector can multiply damages in others. Impacts in the water sector for example
may amplify impacts in agriculture. The model capture this characteristic by the use of
net (affected) GDP as an intermediate input in the sectoral production.
Since climate change is exogenous the only adjustment mechanism besides changes in
capital accumulation is trade between the different severly affected regions. As pointed
out by Julia´ and Duchin (2007), increasing world trade might be an efficient adjustment
strategy for agriculture and probably also for other affected sectors. Our model resultat
give an indication for this argument. The global trade volume, which is defined as the
sum of all exports relative to GWP increases with increasing global warming. This
adjustment of regional sectoral production reduces the total costs from climate change
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Figure 6: Regional Costs from Climate Change in 2100 in percent of GDP relative to
the baseline scenario, ∆GDPr,2100 = −100× Y
A1B
r,2100−Y Br,2100
Y Br,2100
.
impacts. But these costs are not uniformly distributed among regions. Figure 6 shows
large differences in regional damages. East Asia looses only about 2 % of GDP compared
to baseline, whereas South Asia has to cope with costs of 12.5 %. Global warming lowers
GDP for the different European regions from 3 to 5 %, whereas NAFTA has to bear
costs of 5 % of GDP from climate change in 2100. Note that in absolute terms the
loss in NAFTA is larger than the loss in South Asia. An aggregated view substantially
underestimates the costs from climate change for poorer regions. But the less developed
regions in Sub-Sahara Africa, South - and South-East Asia and partly South America,
the regions with that have contributed the least to the anthropogenic greenhouse gas
emissions are the most affected regions from climate change.
5.2 Trade Impacts of Climate Change
The regional differences in exposure to climate impacts causes differences in the regions
productivity and therefore have may influence the competitivness of a region. To examine
the effects on competitiveness in more detail, we calculate the Revealed Comparative
Advantage (RCA) index as introduced by Balassa (1965). In his most simple form the
index is defined as
RCAr,i =
Xr,i∑
iXr,i
/
∑
rXr,i∑
r
∑
iXr,i
, (6)
where Xr,i denotes the region r’s exports of commodity i. If the RCA is greater
(smaller) than unity, the region has a comparative (dis)advantage in the production of
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Figure 7: Percentage change in Terms of Trade comparing baseline and A1B in 2100.
the respective commodity.
The analysis shows that existing comparative advantages are not reversed under
climate change, but rather reinforced (see Table 5 in the Appendix). The regional
competitiveness in commodity production seems to be relativly persistent. South Asia,
which has already a comparative advantage in agriculture, can increase its advantage
within that sector. Since South Asia is one of the most exposed regions to climate
change, it cannot accumulate capital at the same rate as other regions and hence, cannot
compete in more capital intensive sectors. It can be seen in Table 5 that generally less
affected regions gain market shares in capital intensive sectors, whereas the relativly
more affected regions gain competitiveness in labor intensive sectors. And since the
more affected regions are almost identical to the developing regions with low capital
stocks, a reinforcing of existing patterns of trade is the consequence.
In the trans-boundary transmission of climate change costs, changes in Terms of
Trade (ToT) play the decisive role. As shown in the simple Edgeworth-box example
above (see Figure 2), divergent output shocks influence the ToT, defined as the price of a
country’s exports relative to imports. Commodities from regions which are more affected
will become more scarce. This raises the price of exports relative to the price of imports.
The less affected region thus gets less in exchange for the exported commodity. Hence
its ToT are decreasing, whereas the ToT of the stronger affected region are increasing.
Figure 7 depictes the percentage change in ToT, comparing both scenarios in the year
2100. As explained above, the geographic pattern of climate change impacts reinforces
the production allocation in the world economy. Due to climate damages agricultural
production in less capitalized economies decreases and prices increase relatively to capital
intensive goods. Hence capital abundant and less affected regions such as NAFTA have
to cope with a deterioration of ToT, whereas stronger affected regions such as South and
South East Asia profit from improved ToT.
This shows that international trade may lead to a more equal sharing of the unequal
17
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Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis. All graphs show the median loss in regional GDP in the
year 2100 due the climate change relative to the baseline scenario.
distribution of climate impacts among world regions. The stronger affected regions can
shift a fraction of their market damages to the less affected trading partners, since the
unequal exposure causes a change in ToT in favor of the stronger affected regions.
We will discuss the policy implications of these results more in detail in the concluding
section of this paper. In the next section of the paper we will decompose the partition
of the total costs of climate change in direct and spillover effects. This will indicate how
relevant such trade induced spillover effects are for an accurate assessment of climate
change costs.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
But first we will examine the parameter sensitivity of the model with respect to a region’s
total costs from climate change. We have done a careful sensitivity analysis for all crucial
parameters in the model. The model responds quit robust on parameter changes. In
general, assuming an complementary or a nearly perfect substitution relationship in
the CES production functions change the total costs in terms of GWP just about 1.5
percentage points.
Figure 8 presents four exemplary cases. The panel in the top-left shows the by
climate change induced median loss in regional GDP in the year 2100 for a different
Armington elastcities of subsitution between domestic and foreign high value goods.
Climate change costs are high for very low elasticities, decreases for medium parameter
values and does slightly increase again. But the differences between different parameter
values are moderate.
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If we compare different elasticities in the aggregation of the commodities as in the
panel in the bottom left, it is obvious that higher elasticities reduce climate change
costs. A higher elasticity allows for more flexibility in consumption and hence, a better
adapation of trade patterns to minimize costs from climate change.
As shown in the panel in the bottom right of figure 8 causes an increase in intertem-
poral elasticities of subsitution σ significant increases of losses. Since a higher σ alows
for a better subsitutionability between the consumption of different periods it reduces
the necessity to invest capital and maintain the economy under such unfavorable circum-
stances such as in the A1B scenario in the year 2100. Hence, the differences between
climate change and the baseline case are rather increased.
6 Decomposition of Climate Change Impacts
In order to assess the transmission of spillover impacts from one region to another, we
need a method to decompose aggregate climate change impacts into a domestic part and
the spillover contributions from other regions.
General equilibrium modeling has the advantage of being more realistic with respect
to the functionality of the economy, but has the disadvantage that many processes hap-
pen simultaneous. Positive or negative feedback cause an amplification or a reduction of
an exogenous shock. If simultaneously different shocks take place, an assignment of the
economic impact of a certain shock is challenging. Several methods have been developed
to overcome this problem.
For differentiating between domestic impacts on the one hand and foreign ones on
the other we apply a method, which was suggested by Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson
(2000). It is in the nature of the problem that climate impacts happen simultaneously
in different regions. In a ceteris paribus examination one regional climate impact would
shock the system after another. And hence, the magnitude of a shock impact depends
on the sequence of his incidence. For example the impact of climate change in NAFTA
on East Asia’s ToT depends on whether South Asia’s climate impact are already taken
into account or not. But with n regions, n! different sequences of shocks are possible. To
overcome this problem Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson present a generic decomposition
method which is independent from the order of shocks. Their method calculates the
contributions of a single shock on the examined variable such that the rate of change
across all exogenous shocks is kept constant.
The original decomposition procedure by Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson (2000)
was implemented in GEMPACK: Bo¨hringer and Rutherford (2004) have developed an
implementation for CGE models in GAMS. The approach of Bo¨hringer and Rutherford
needs a repeated solving of the model to evaluate the necessary derivatives numerically,
which makes the decomposition procedure relative CPU time intensive.
Since we use a multi-period model, from a theoretical point of view one should cal-
culate the contribution of the climate impact of a certain region and at a certain time
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period on current and future time periods in all other regions. Because of reasons for
computational efficiency we simplify the decomposition and consider only the contribu-
tion of a specific regional impact on the same period on other regions. To do that we
use a static version of the dynamic trade model, which is able to replicate the periodic
equilibria of the dynamic model.
The application of the above explained decomposition technique shows that because
of international trade regional climate impacts can affect the welfare of economies which
are geographically far away from the location where the impact occurs. We show this
exemplary with the decomposition of general equilibrium effects from regional climate
impacts in the year 2100.
Figure 9 shows the difference in discounted regional GDP between the baseline and
A1B scenario and the respective contribution of direct and spillover effects to the total
difference in percent of baseline GDP. As we have seen in the last section, climate costs
are unequal distributed among regions. The same holds for the distribution of spillover
and direct impacts. There seems to be no clear relationship between the magnitude of
direct and spillover effects. South East Asia and South Asia, the two regions which have
to cope with the largest impacts, profit differently from the spillover effects and their
integration into international trade. Whereas South East Asia is able to reduce climate
costs by about 15 % due to improved Terms of Trade, South Asia is not able to profit
from this channel. The ability to profit from spillover effects depends on (1) the demand
for commodities for which the affected region has a comparative advantage and (2) on
the state and ability of the trading partners to buy the supplied goods.
There seems to be also evidence for our hypothesis that in the case of countries
which have higher adaptive capacities and are less exposed to direct impacts, such as
most developed regions, spillover impacts are responsible for a significant part of total
climate costs. In all European regions apart from Eastern Europe and in NAFTA the
fraction of spillover impact on total climate costs is about one third. The decomposition
of the general equilibrium effects shows that direct impacts alone explain only a part of
the total costs from climate impacts a region has to cope with. It is therefore necessary
for an accurate assessment of a region’s climate costs to incorporate the effects on trade
from differences in the climate impact exposure.
7 Concluding Remarks & Policy Implications
We have showed in a general equilibrium model and with regional climate scenarios that
costs from global climate change are not uniformly distributed among regions. Whereas
regions in higher latitudes have at the end of the century between 2 - 3 % less GDP
compared to a situation without climate change, South Asian regions have to cope with
a loss in GDP in the range of 10 and 12 %. This heterogeneity influences also regional
competitiveness and Terms of Trade.
We are able to show that linkages from international trade matter for an accurate
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Figure 9: Total costs, direct and spillover effects of climate change in percent of baseline
GDP.
assessment of the climate costs. Since the today less developed regions will be harder
affected from environmental changes, imbalances in regional competitiveness will be
pronounced. The main driver for the changing competitiveness is the impact of climate
change on capital accumulation. Hence the largest changes in the competitiveness are
observed in capital intensive goods. Regions, which start already with higher capital
stocks and are relatively less affected by global warming, such as most of the OECD
countries, gain competitiveness in this commodities. Contrary developing countries are
only able to compete in labor intensive goods such as agriculture. Our results there-
fore contradicts results from partial equilibrium studies of the agricultural market as in
Julia´ and Duchin (2007), which suggest that climate change is not a problem for to-
tal agricultural supply, since production will shift towards North. Since trade balances
have to be equalized, the South is compelled to produce labor intensive commodities
whereas the North has still a comparative advantage in the production of capital inten-
sive goods. From that perspective trade is not an effective moderator of differences in
climate change impacts. Due to that argument, Cline (2007) argues that the notion that
trade will greatly reduce losses from climate change has a “let them eat cake” flavor.
Our analysis shows further that climate change also slows or reverses the conver-
gence process between developing and developed regions, which contradicts the assumed
regional convergence in most of the IPCC emission scenarios.
The linkages between different affected regions through international trade cause
spillover effects, which may affect regional welfare. To identify the magnitude of this
spillover effects for an individual region we apply an decomposition method proposed by
Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson (2000).
The costs related to those spillover effects might be relative severe. Due to gains
in Terms of Trade, most developing regions with higher exposure to climate change
impacts benefit from better ToT, whereas in in the case of most European regions and
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NAFTA spillover effects are responsible for a third of expected total costs from climate
change. This shows that for an accurate cost assessment this international dimension
has to be included. But by the same token it should also be mentioned that a towards
more protectionism oriented trade policy in the less affected regions can not reduce
welfare losses from climate change, since it just would voluntary abandon welfare gains
from trade, which are by definition greater than the spillover effects. Since international
trade causes an efficient allocation of production factors and dampens global costs of
climate change, it is rather appropriate to fortify efforts for stronger multilateral trade
agreements.
This study shows that the two topics climate change and international trade should
be discussed in a common context to accuratly assess the costs of climate change for
a specific region. The nexus between trade and costs of climate change should also
be included in international negotiations about future climate and/or trade agreements.
Transfer schemes or the funding of adaptation in developing countries may help to reduce
spillover costs for regions, which are less affected by direct impacts. Since the divergence
in capital accumulation is one of the main drivers for the changes in competitiveness, a
further facilitation of capital mobility between regions may help to reduce the problem
as well.
We highlight in this study the link between the costs of climate change and interna-
tional trade. But there are still a lot of open questions and hence this complex deserves
to be examined more in detail in further research. Better knowledge about the sectoral
impacts of climate change for example might help to get a sharper picture about the
impacts of climate change on international trade and production patterns. The compre-
hension of newer theories of international trade may also generate additional insights for
such second order consequences of climate change.
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Region θ1r θ
2
r θ
3
r θ
4
r
Switzerland 0.347 -0.003 -0.238 0.401
China -0.234 0.055 -0.044 0.112
East Asia -0.424 0.125 0.083 0.128
South East Asia 0.839 -0.052 -0.083 0.169
South Asia 1.454 -0.151 -0.059 0.531
NAFTA -0.024 0.038 -0.025 0.098
South America 0.189 0.047 -0.102 0.217
Oceania -1.038 0.203 -0.077 0.207
Sub-Sahara Africa 1.763 -0.185 -0.047 0.084
MENA 0.433 0.017 -0.044 0.101
GUS -0.707 0.095 0.095 0.264
Eastern Europe 0.331 -0.021 -0.060 0.101
Northern Europe 0.347 -0.003 -0.092 0.438
South & Southeastern Europe 0.339 -0.012 -0.076 0.270
Western Europe 0.347 -0.003 -0.092 0.438
Table 2: Estimated coefficients of the damage function. Based on data of Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000).
A Appendix
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Region ∆T
Switzerland 4.75
China 5.33
East Asia 4.23
South East Asia 3.98
South Asia 5.57
NAFTA 5.76
South America 4.60
Oceania 4.57
Sub-Sahara Africa 5.25
MENA 5.06
GUS 6.88
Eastern Europe 4.62
Northern Europe 4.86
South & Southeastern Europe 4.63
Western Europe 4.41
World Average 4.22
Table 3: Average regional annual temperature anomaly in 2100 in degree Celsius. Cal-
culations based on ECHAM5 A1B.
Agg. Good Involved Products
Agriculture (A) Crops, Wheat, Forestry, Diary Products ...
High Value Goods (H) Machinery, Motor vehicles, ...
Basic Material (B) Textiles, Metals, ...
Services (S) Financial Services, Tourism, ...
Fossil Energy (F) Coal, Oil, Gas
Non-Fossil Energy (NF) Renewable electricity
Table 4: Sectors in the model and the assigned goods
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Sector A B H S
Region Base A1B Base A1B Base A1B Base A1B
CHE 0.19 0.44 0.99 1.46
CHN 0.64 + .01 2.12 + .01 0.94 0.65
EAS 0.35 1.06 + .01 1.45 0.41
EEU 0.73 1.38 0.88 - .01 1.08
GUS 1.35 + .01 2.75 - .01 0.52 0.86
MEN 1.55 + .02 1.39 0.87 0.89
NAF 0.89 + .02 0.60 + .03 1.03 + .01 1.17 +.04
NEU 0.71 - .02 0.48 - .01 0.93 1.42 +.02
OCE 3.53 + .03 0.83 + .02 0.45 + .01 1.36 -.01
SAF 3.33 + .03 1.94 - .02 0.65 0.59
SAM 3.78 1.64 0.63 0.65
SEA 1.37 + .02 1.11 - .03 1.28 - .01 0.44 +.02
SEE 0.63 1.02 - .01 0.73 1.50 -.01
SOA 1.98 + .08 2.93 - .08 0.52 - .01 0.64 +.01
WEU 1.00 - .03 0.51 0.87 - .01 1.43 +.03
Table 5: Values in column Base show the Revealed Comparative Advantage for the year
2100 under the baseline scenario. Column A1B shows the change in the RCA index
caused by climate change. If cells are empty no significant change was observed.
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